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WHY THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, AND THE JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF IT, HAS LED TO A LAWLESS INTERNET IN 
THE AREA OF DEFAMATION 
Colby Ferris* 
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a lawyer representing a client charged with driving under the 
influence.1 After researching and analyzing case law, you decide how the case 
should be argued but the client does not agree with your strategy. He wants to ar-
gue a different theory, but professional responsibility prevents you from presenting 
the case the way your client desires. When the dispute culminates, the client finds 
other counsel, and you later learn he was acquitted of the charge.  
Usually this would be the end of the story. However, your former client is an-
gry that you refused to see things his way, a way that eventually led to success, and 
that he spent his time and money on your legal strategy. As an outlet for his anger 
the former client joins a legal forum on Yahoogle.com (“Yahoogle”), an extremely 
popular Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) with millions of subscribers. The former 
client posts bulletins in the legal forum claiming you do not have a valid law de-
gree, are practicing law without a license, and are violating professional responsi-
bility rules by sleeping with your current clients. Weeks later, when these posts 
come to your attention, you notify Yahoogle of the defamatory content and ask that 
the bulletins be removed and a retraction printed. Yahoogle replies that, per its 
stated policy, it does not police forums and does not remove posts or offer retrac-
tions.  
After few weeks, the former client posts new bulletins claiming you win cases 
by bribing judges and, in fact, offered to bribe a judge on his behalf. Again, you 
contact Yahoogle and ask that the bulletins be removed, or that the user be blocked 
from posting additional defamatory bulletins. Yahoogle replies that it is not in a 
position to determine what material is defamatory, and it will not remove the bulle-
tins or block future bulletins. Instead, Yahoogle informs you that the former 
client’s posts have drawn significant interest, so it is moving them to a more prom-
inent position on its website.2 You want redress for the harm to your reputation, 
and you know that your former client will never be able to pay a judgment, but can 
you sue Yahoogle for the role it played in allowing the bulletins to remain and for 
even moving them so more people could view them? 
 ________________________  
 *  Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, expected J.D. 2010. 
 1.  Though additional details have been added, this illustration is based in part on the experience of Rafe 
Banks. Laura Parker, Courts are asked to crack down on bloggers, websites, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2006, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-02-bloggers-courts_x.htm?loc=interstitialskip.  
 2. Compare Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding America Online immune 
from liability even though it actively promoted the gossip column that created a defamatory story).  
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First, this article explores how law of defamation has been applied in the brick 
and mortar world, and how those same principles were applied to the cyber world.3
Next it looks at Congress’s legislation of defamation law on the Internet, and how 
that legislation has been applied in court. Finally, it evaluates the changing attitude 
toward that legislation, and changes Congress should consider making.  
I.  THE COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION
A. Generally 
A communication is defamatory when it tends to harm the reputation of anoth-
er in a way that disparages him in the community, or deters others from associating 
with him.4 No actual harm to the reputation needs to be proven, it is enough that 
the communication is the type that generally tends to have such an effect.5 Addi-
tionally, the comment need only prejudice the person in the eyes of a substantial 
and respectable minority of the community, rather than the community at large.6
Liability for defamation hinges on the requirements that there must be: (1) a false 
and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) publication of that statement to a 
third party; (3) negligence, or some higher standard of fault, on the part of the pub-
lisher; and (4) the statement is either harmful per se, or the publication caused spe-
cial harm.7
B. Three Standards of Liability 
   One who repeats or republishes information is known as a secondary dissemi-
nator and is liable as the original publisher even if he acknowledges the original 
publisher.8
Courts have softened the blow of secondary disseminator liability by dividing 
them into three classes: common carriers, distributors, and publishers. Common 
carriers, most often telephone and telegraph companies, have no control over the 
communications flowing over their wires; thus, they are generally not liable for 
publishing defamatory statements, even if they knew or had reason to know the 
statements were defamatory.9
 ________________________  
 3. While reading also consider the result if your scenario took place in the brick and mortar world: Your 
former client printed his bulletins on a flyer and gave them to a magazine stand to give to customers. After you 
told the magazine stand the fliers contained defamatory material the stand continued to hand out new fliers, and 
even moved them right next to the register to draw more customers.  
 4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
 5. Id. cmt. d.  
 6. Id. cmt. e. 
 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558. See also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(analyzing the general requirements that the communication be published, and “of or concerning the plaintiff,” but 
holding that a showing of actual malice on the part of the publisher is required for statements concerning public 
officials). 
 8. Cianci v. N.Y. Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (1980).
 9. Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746 (1974) (holding that the telephone company, by law, may 
only restrict certain uses, defamation not included). Additionally, telephone companies have no technological 
means by which to edit or restrict the rapidly flowing content. Id. at 751. The court reasoned that Xerox could not 
2
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Distributors, such as libraries, news stands, book stores, and television network 
affiliates, have little or no control over the editorial aspects of the products they 
sell, and are not liable for publishing the defamatory comment of another unless the 
distributor knew or had reason to know of the comment’s defamatory character.10
In Hustler, the plaintiff sought to hold two distributors of Hustler Magazine liable 
for allegedly defamatory statements contained in the magazine.11 The District 
Court held that if distributors were forced to self-censor all the books and maga-
zines they sold, the available materials would be depleted either because they were 
not acceptable or because the distributor simply did not have time to censor them.12
Therefore, a distributor is under no duty to examine the materials he sells to ascer-
tain whether they are defamatory.13
In another case, the court held that a television affiliate is a mere conduit for 
information and will only face liability if it knows, or has reason to know, of the 
defamatory statements it republished.14 The court noted that the television affiliate 
did not exercise any editorial control over the program, though it had the contrac-
tual right to do so, and had, in fact censored other programs in the past.15 The court 
held that these facts did not impose a duty to censor all programming.16
Finally, courts treat publishers, such as newspapers and book publishers, like 
the original speaker of the statement because these entities carryout significant 
editorial functions and maintain control over the statements and communications 
they publish.17 Publication includes intentionally or negligently communicating 
defamatory statements to people other than the one defamed.18 In a case involving 
Newsweek Magazine, the magazine republished statements taken out of context 
be held liable for defamatory statements printed on a machine it leased to a third party even if it had notice of 
those statements, therefore the telephone company could not be held liable for defamatory statements transmitted 
through its leased equipment. Id.   
 10. Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, (E.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d, 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983).  
 11. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 611 F. Supp. 781 (D. Wyo. 1985).  
 12. Id. at 786. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959)). 
 13. Hustler, 611 F. Supp. at 786. citing RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. d. Additionally the 
court held: A realization that Hustler was once sued for libel, is not the equivalent of actual knowledge, and is not 
sufficient to put the distributor on notice to check each Hustler magazine for defamatory material. Hustler, 611 F. 
Supp. at 787. “If that was the proper standard, every distributor of publications, such as the National Enquirer, or 
such respected publications as Time and The New York Times, which have also had their fair share of libel suits, 
would have to check each issue, at his peril, for possible libelous statements about people or events of which the 
average publication distributor might have no basis for judgment.” Id. “Such a standard is not in our society’s best 
interests; it would foster excessive censorship, and would deprive the public of reading educational and entertain-
ment materials, all in direct contradiction of the right of freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 
Id.
 14. Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (E.D. Wash. 1992).  
 15. Id. at 931. 
 16. Id. The court also noted that the affiliate could carry the burden of censoring every item it aired. Id.
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 557. 
 18. Id. The scale between which a statement must be published intentionally or negligently slides depend-
ing on the public and political status of the subject. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-280 (1964) 
(holding that a publisher is only liable for defamatory statements about public figures that are published with 
actual malice); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that, so long as they don’t impose liability 
without fault, states may determine the level of negligence required to recover for defamatory statements about 
private individuals).  
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and were held liable for the resulting defamation.19 Because Newsweek has editori-
al control over the content it publishes, and because it republished quotes in a con-
text that made them defamatory, it was held liable as the primary publisher of the 
quotes.20
Under the common law most defendants were either a distributor, facing liabil-
ity only if it knew or had reason to know of the defamatory material, or a publisher, 
facing liability just as if it were the original speaker of the statement.21
C. Applying the Common Law Principals in an Uncommon Space 
As the Internet developed, courts had to decide how to handle defamatory 
statements plastered across the Internet in chat rooms, blogs, message boards, e-
mails, and online forums. Particularly, courts needed to determine the liability of 
ISPs for defamatory statements published on sites hosted by the ISPs.  
In an early case, CompuServe provided access to an electronic library that gave 
subscribers access to thousands of information sources and over 150 special inter-
est forums.22 One forum dedicated to journalism provided the publication Rumor-
ville USA (“Rumorville”), a daily newsletter about broadcast journalists.23 Cubby 
claimed that CompuServe, through Rumorville, published defamatory statements 
about his competing publication.24 CompuServe argued that it was merely a dis-
tributor and not a publisher, and thus could not be held liable for defamatory con-
tent it of which it was unaware.25 The court analyzed the defamation claim in the 
context of the everyday world, unimpeded by the abnormalities of the Internet. It 
held that CompuServe’s database was essentially an electronic, for-profit library.26
Although CompuServe could decline to carry a given publication, once it commit-
ted to do so it had little to no editorial control over the contents.27 The court held 
that CompuServe had the same control over the publications it carried as a public 
library, book store, or newsstand, and that it would be no more feasible for Com-
puServe to examine every publication than any of those distributors to do so.28 Be-
cause the court determined CompuServe was a distributor, the appropriate standard 
of liability was whether CompuServe knew or had reason to know of the defamato-
 ________________________  
 19. Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding “A publisher may not escape 
liability for defamation when it takes words out of context and uses them to convey a false representation of fact”). 
 20. Id.
 21. Let’s go back to the brick and mortar example of your problems with your former client, supra note 3. 
In that example, the magazine stand is a traditional distributor, and he had knowledge that fliers he was distribut-
ing contained defamatory material. Thus, he is going to be liable to you for damages.  




 26. Id. at 140.  
 27. Id. The court placed nearly no weight on the fact that Cameron Communications, Inc. contracted to 
manage, review, edit, and otherwise control the content of the journalism forum for CompuServe. Id. at 137.  
 28. Id. The court reasoned that a computerized database is the functional equivalent of a traditional news 
vendor, and since a national distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to monitor each issue of every 
periodical it distributes, applying an inconsistent standard of liability to an electronic news distributor such as 
CompuServe would impose an undue burden on the free flow of information. Id.
4
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ry material.29 Cubby did not allege that CompuServe had any such knowledge; 
therefore, the court granted CompuServe summary judgment on the defamation 
issue.30
CompuServe’s holding was based on sound legal reasoning that left the three 
traditional types of secondary disseminators in place. This allowed courts to eva-
luate websites and ISPs on a case-by-case basis to determine which standard should 
apply to that particular website or ISP. However, after Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Congress stepped in with legal reasoning of its own.  In that case, 
the court held the ISP liable for defamatory statements posted by an individual 
user.31 Prodigy had at least two million subscribers and hosted the most widely 
read financial computer bulletin board in America, Money Talks.32 Prodigy, to 
distinguish itself from the competition, expressly held itself out as exercising edi-
torial control, like that of a newspaper, on its site.33 Prodigy advanced content 
guidelines and stated that it would remove insulting and harassing material when 
brought to its attention.34 Several comments were posted alleging that Stratton 
Oakmont and its executive officers committed fraud, criminal violations, and were 
a group of brokers who lied for a living.35 The court found that Prodigy was a pub-
lisher of the defamatory statements because it chose to take editorial control over 
the content on its site.36 Because Prodigy held itself out as controlling the content 
of the bulletin boards, and Prodigy actually implemented this control through 
guidelines enforced by board leaders and automated software screening, Prodigy 
gained the benefits of editorial control, and the burden of greater liability.37
II.  CHANGING THE COMMON LAW TO COPE WITH ETIQUETTE ON THE 
INTERNET
A. Legislation protecting ISPs   
In 1998, Congress passed 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (“section 230”) of the Communi-
cations Decency Act (“CDA” or the “Act”). Congress found that, with minimal 
government regulation, the Internet flourished to the benefit of all Americans be-
cause it offered a forum for diverse political discourse, opportunities for cultural 
development, and avenues for intellectual activity.38
 ________________________  
 29. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 141. 
 30. Id.   
 31. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). See 
also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating that Congress legislated in response to 
the Stratton Oakmont decision).  
 32. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 229, at *3.  
 33. Id.
 34. Id. at *5.  
 35. Id. at *1, 2. 
 36. Id. at *10. The court dismissed the argument that Prodigy, now receiving over 60,000 messages a day, 
had long ago abandoned its policy of reviewing all messages. Id. at *8. Prodigy submitted no documentation 
stating it had abandoned that policy, or that it disseminated news of such a change. Id.
 37. Id. at *10-13. 
 38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a)(3),(4).  
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The pertinent section of the Act gives “protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ block-
ing and screening of offensive material.”39 The Act states, “[n]o provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”40
The Act immunizes any provider or user of an interactive computer service 
from liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, las-
civious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether 
or not such material is constitutionally protected.”41 The Act further immunizers 
providers and users from liability for making available to other information content 
providers the technical means to restrict access to the above material.42
B. Courts Interpret the CDA as the Downfall of ISP Liability for     
 Defamation 
“[C]ourts have treated section 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a rela-
tively expansive definition of “interactive computer service” and a relatively re-
strictive definition of “information content provider.”43
The seminal case applying section 230 of the CDA eliminates liability for ISPs 
in nearly every scenario.44 In that case, an anonymous user posted advertisements 
for offensive t-shirts on one of America Online’s (“AOL”) community bulletin 
boards.45 The t-shirts had tasteless slogans relating to the Oklahoma City bombings 
that had occurred just weeks before.46 The advertisement instructed purchasers to 
contact “Ken” at Zeran’s home phone number.47 Zeran received a high degree of 
angry phone calls, some including death threats, and contacted AOL that evening 
in regards to the posting.48 The AOL employee promised to remove the posting, but 
stated that, as a matter of policy, AOL did not print retractions.49 The anonymous 
user continued to post the advertisements for four days.50 By the fifth day Zeran 
was receiving abusive phone calls approximately every two minutes.51 During this 
time Zeran repeatedly contacted AOL and was told the anonymous user’s account 
 ________________________  
 39. § 230(c). 
 40. § 230(c)(1). The Act defines “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server. . . .” § 
230(f)(2). It defines “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, 
for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service.” § 230(f)(3). 
 41. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 42. § 230(c)(2)(B). 
 43. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 44. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. The lone exception appears to be if the ISP actually thinks up, drafts, and posts 
its own statement. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123-25.  
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would soon be closed.52  Zeran filed suit against AOL, and AOL interposed section 
230 of the CDA as an affirmative defense.53 The court held lawsuits seeking to 
hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions, such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content, 
are barred because section 230 prevents courts from hearing claims that would 
place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.54
In evaluating Congress’s purpose for passing section 230, the court stated that 
Congress recognized the threat of tort liability to the Internet as simply another 
form of intrusive government regulation on speech, and made a policy choice not 
to deter harmful online speech by imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially defamatory messages.55 The court em-
phasized that service providers have millions of users so that it would be impossi-
ble to screen all postings for possible problems, and if faced with potential liability 
for each message posted, the providers might choose to severely restrict the num-
ber and type of messages posted, which would have an obvious chilling effect on 
free speech.56 Finally, the court noted that Congress wanted to encourage self-
regulation of offensive material distributed over service provider’s networks.57
Thus, Congress passed § 230 in part to remove disincentives to self-regulation 
stemming from Stratton Oakmont.58
To this point, the holding in Zeran held no surprises in light of section 230. 
However, the court took the CDA one step further and held that ISPs could not be 
held liable as distributors of defamatory information when they knew or had reason 
to know of it.59 Zeran argued that “distributor” carried a legally distinct meaning 
from “publisher” in the area of defamation law.60 In section 230 Congress chose to 
employ only the term “publisher,” thus leaving distributors liable under common 
law defamation standards.61 The court disagreed, stating that distributor liability is 
merely a subset of publisher liability, and is also immunized under section 230.62
The Court held that the terms “publisher” and “distributor” derive their legal signi-
ficance from defamation law and are indistinguishable from garden-variety defa-
mation claims.63 Furthermore, it explained that everyone who takes part in the pub-
lication, even the distributor, is considered a “publisher” for the purposes of defa-
 ________________________  
 52. Zeran, 129 F.3d 329. Adding to the ordeal, a radio station in Oklahoma received a copy of the AOL 
postings and urged listeners to call Zeran’s home number. About fourteen days later, after Zeran spoke with the 
station, it issued an on-air apology, and the calls receded to about fifteen per day. 
 53. Id.
 54. Id. at 330. 
 55. Id. at 330-31. 
 56. Id. at 331. 
 57. Id.
 58. Id. The court reasoned that the ISP in Stratton Oakmont subjected itself to liability for attempting to 
regulate the dissemination of offensive material; therefore, other ISPs would not risk such liability, and would 
instead let harmful and offensive material reign free on their services. Id.
 59. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. 
 60. Id. at 331-32. 
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mation law.64 The court explained the distinction between publisher and distributor 
only signified different levels of liability within the larger publisher category, and 
though decisions like Stratton Oakmont and Cubby utilized the terms separately, 
those cases did not suggest that distributors are not also a type of publisher for pur-
poses of defamation law.65 Finally, the court held the interpretive canon favoring 
retention of common law principles unless Congress speaks directly to the issue did 
not apply because Congress did speak directly to the issue by employing the legally 
significant term “publisher.”66
Though nearly every circuit evaluating this issue has agreed with the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis, it has met much criticism in the academic world. First, the court 
noted that the terms publisher and distributor are indistinguishable from the gar-
den-variety defamation claim. However, this misses the point; section 230 does not 
immunize ISPs from garden-variety defamation claims, it immunizes claims 
against publishers only. The court went on to point out that the terms only signify 
different levels of liability, but this doesn’t seem to advance the court’s argument. 
If Congress’s intent was to destroy liability, then it is logical that Congress would 
have spoken directly to all levels of liability. Next, the court noted that, although 
Stratton Oakmont and Cubby speak of distributors and publishers separately, they 
do not suggest distributors are not also publishers. Although this is true, it is of 
little value. Those courts did recognize that distributors are necessarily publishers, 
but fundamental to the issue of liability is the level of publisher. Lastly, the court 
claimed that Congress did speak directly to the distinction between distributor and 
publisher, by “using the legally significant term publisher.”67 This conclusion is 
circular. Courts have spent hundreds of reporter pages evaluating whether defen-
dants were distributors or publishers because, under defamation law, there is a le-
gally significant difference -one that the court in Zeran brushes aside with far too 
little consideration.68
Most courts around the country have followed the Zeran analysis to the letter. 
If the defendant satisfies the following three requirements laid out in section 230, it 
receives complete immunity from defamation claims. First, the defendant must be 
an interactive computer service as defined by the Act.69 Next, the plaintiff must 
allege the defendant is a publisher or speaker of the material.70 Finally, the com-
munication must have been provided by “another” information content provider, 
specifically someone other than the defendant.71 In a Tenth Circuit case, the plain-
tiff admitted that AOL was an interactive service provider, but argued that it was 
 ________________________  
 64. Id.
 65. Id.
 66. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333-34. 
 67. Id.
 68. While interesting, whether courts should have continued to recognize distributor liability under the 
CDA section 230 is beyond the scope of this note. Moreover, Congress has recognized that it agrees with the 
courts’ interpretation and application of section 230. H.R. REP. NO. 107-449 at 13. (2002). 
 69. Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2007). See 
also supra text accompanying note 40 for the definition of an interactive computer service. 
 70. Id.
 71. Id. See also supra the text accompanying note 40 for the definition of an information content provider.  
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also a content provider because it participated in the creation and development of 
the incorrect stock quotation information.72 In an effort to correct errors, AOL 
worked closely with the stock quote providers, and sometimes deleted stock sym-
bols and other information.73 The plaintiff argued that those editorial actions con-
stituted “creation or development” of information, making AOL an information 
content provider under section 230.74 The plaintiff could not show that AOL con-
tributed to the material posted, and, in fact, AOL’s contract with the stock quote 
providers stipulated that AOL could not modify or revise the submitted informa-
tion.75 The court determined that by deleting incorrect information, AOL per-
formed the exact self-regulating functions Congress sought to protect, and affirmed 
the lower court’s grant of immunity.76
In the First Circuit, a plaintiff tried to avoid demise under section 230 by 
claiming the defendant did not provide access to the Internet, and, therefore, was 
not an interactive service provider.77 The court held that an interactive service pro-
vider does not actually have to provide service to the Internet.78 The plaintiff also 
attempted to claim that the defendant created and developed the information be-
cause through the construction and operation of its website, it allowed anonymous 
subscribers to spread misinformation in a context associated with objective con-
tent.79 The court rejected this argument because no misinformation was prompted 
by the website’s registration process and the features of the website were aligned 
with message boards on other websites.80 The website operator escaped with no 
liability.81
A lower court in the Ninth Circuit attempted to hold a matchmaking website li-
able for defamation as a publisher because the website provided part of the profile 
content by requiring users to answer certain questions from a list of pre-prepared 
responses.82 In this case an anonymous user created a profile for a well-known ac-
tress.83 The profile included the actress’s home address and phone number, and 
indicated that the actress was looking for a one-night stand, and a “hard and domi-
nant” man with “a strong sexual appetite,” and that she “liked sort of being con-
trolled by a man, in and out of bed.”84 As a result of the posting, the actress re-
ceived sexually explicit phone calls, and a sexually explicit and threatening fax, 
which also threatened her son.85
 ________________________  
 72. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 73. Id. at 985. 
 74. Id.
 75. Id. at 986. 
 76. Id.
 77. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007).
 78. Id.
 79. Id. at 420. 
 80. Id.
 81. Id. at 427. 
 82. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122.  
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The Appellate Court reversed the decision, holding that the website did not 
play a significant role in creating or developing the relevant information because 
the underlying misinformation was provided solely by the user, and most of the 
relevant defamatory information was provided through essay questions.86
The application of section 230 has consistently led to broad immunity for 
ISP’s, website operators, and other Internet users. Since most information content 
providers are unidentifiable, unreachable, or unable to satisfy judgment, section 
230 leaves the defamed victim without any source of redress.  
C. The Decency Act Deviants: Courts Working Towards a Fairer Inter-
pretation of the Good Samaritan Statute. 
The District Court for the District of Columbia questioned the logic behind al-
lowing the ISP to promote the defamation and then escape liability for it.87  In 
Blumenthal, AOL actively promoted a gossip column that defamed a politician by 
alleging he abused his wife.88 The court questioned why an ISP should be able to 
flaunt a rumormonger’s ability to make rumors instantly accessible to its subscrib-
ers and then claim immunity when that person, as might be anticipated, defames 
another?89 Although the court did not agree with the implications of § 230, it 
upheld the ISP’s immunity in that case.90
In a Ninth Circuit case, the court carved out an exception to the rigid immunity 
usually applied under § 230.91 In that case, a handyman sent an e-mail to a Museum 
Security Network (“Network”) claiming a local lawyer told him she was related to 
Hitler’s right-hand man, and telling the Network he thought she possessed stolen 
European artwork.92 The Network published the e-mail on its listserv and e-mailed 
it to Network subscribers.93 The handyman maintained he never would have sent 
the e-mail had he known it would be published.94 The court took issue with wheth-
er the handyman actually provided content to the ISP for use on the Internet, since 
the handyman did not fathom that the information would be published.95 The court 
held that “immunizing providers and users of interactive computer services for 
publishing material when they have reason to know that the material is not in-
tended for publication . . . contravenes the Congressional purpose of encouraging 
the development of the Internet.”96 Therefore, an ISP is immune from liability only 
 ________________________  
 86. Id. at 124-25.
 87. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp at 51. 
 88. Id. at 46-48. 
 89. Id. at 51.  
 90. Id. The court opined that AOL had editorial rights with respect to the gossip column, and actively 
promoted it, but took no responsibility for the harm it caused. Id. The court said that, had it been writing on a clean 
slate, the court would have found it fair to hold AOL to the same liability standard applied to a traditional publish-
er, or at least to that of a distributor. Id.
 91. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 92. Id. at 1021-22.  
 93. Id. at 1022.  
 94. Id. Because of the publication the lawyer lost clients and was investigated by the state bar. Id.
 95. Id. at 1032. 
 96. Id. at 1034.  
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when a third party furnished information to the provider under circumstances in 
which a reasonable person in the service provider’s position would conclude the 
information was provided for publication on the Internet.97 The Batzel decision 
provides one of the first deviations from the strict immunization usually provided 
under section 230. 
The dissent in that case suggested the court should focus on the defendant’s 
acts to determine whether liability attaches for publication of defamatory materi-
al.98 The dissent argued that the “CDA immunizes a defendant only when the de-
fendant took no active role in selecting the questionable information for publica-
tion.”99 Judge Gould reasoned that when the defendant takes an active role in se-
lecting text for publication, the information ceases to be provided by another as 
required under the Act.100 He argued that if a website employed a person to read 
through submissions to determine which should be published, that person could 
also screen the submissions for defamatory content.101
In a later Ninth Circuit case, the court held a website operator liable for violat-
ing the Fair Housing Act because the website operator was also an information 
content provider.102 Roommate.com (“Roommate”) required subscribers to create 
profiles by answering a prepared list of questions with a prepared list of answers.103
The prepared questions required subscribers to answer questions regarding their 
sex, sexual preference, parental status, and preference of those aspects in a room-
mate, which violated the Fair Housing Act.104 “The Communications Decency Act 
was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”105 Roommate 
designed its registration process around questions and choice of answers it 
created.106 “Therefore, Roommate is undoubtedly the ‘information content provid-
er’ as to the questions and can claim no immunity for posting them on its website, 
or for forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services.”107
The court held that by requiring every profile page to be a collaborative effort be-
tween Roommate and the subscriber, Roommate was responsible at least in part for 
every such page.108 Roommate lost immunity under section 230 when it became an 
information content provider rather than merely a website host.  
One defamation law commentator stated after Roommate: “[t]he erosion of the 
immunity provisions for interactive service providers picks up some serious mo-
mentum as the Courts now begin picking apart the broad immunity interpretation 
 ________________________  
 97. Id.
 98. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1038. 
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
 101. Id. at 1038-39. 
 102. Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (Ninth Cir. 2008). 
 103. Id. at 1161.  
 104. Id.
 105. Id. at 1164. 
 106. Id.
 107. Id. The court emphasized that unlawful questions lead to unlawful answers and Roommate.com made 
answering discriminatory questions a condition of doing business. Id. at 1165.  
 108. Id. at 1167.  
11
: Communication Indecency
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2010
134 Barry Law Review Vol. 14 
taken by free speech advocates.”109 The commentator speculated that in reality sec-
tion 230 immunity was being abused by “mobospheres” encouraging and facilitat-
ing defamatory attacks.110
D. Working Toward Actual Decency on the Internet: Middle Ground Be-
tween Lawlessness and Overregulation. 
In response to the rampant, unpunished defamatory material on the Internet, 
many victims are pursing cases against individual users who are primary publish-
ers, even when there is no chance the individual will be able to satisfy a judg-
ment.111 In one such case, Sue Scheff sued Carey Bock for defamatory statements 
Bock made over the Internet.112 Scheff knew Bock would not be able to satisfy the 
judgment, but Scheff was so vested in getting vindication for the defamation she 
was even willing to pay the court costs.113 She wanted to send a message to people 
who are using the Internet to destroy people they do not like. Individuals should 
not be forced to file fruitless lawsuits to send a message that Congress and the judi-
cial system should have sent all along. In the world outside of the Internet, the law 
has never allowed individuals to destroy the reputations of other people simply 
because the individual does not like the other person. It makes no sense that the law 
currently allows individuals to do just that in the cyber world – a world where it is 
infinitely easier and faster to disseminate defamatory information. Congress must 
pass legislation that facilitates free speech on the Internet without encouraging the 
rampant spread of defamatory material.  
One obvious solution available to Congress is to maintain immunity for ISPs 
acting in traditional publishing functions, but reinstate liability for ISPs acting as 
distributors when those ISP’s know or should know of defamatory content. Several 
courts have argued that imposing liability only when ISPs fail to remove material 
will chill free speech because ISPs will have incentive to rip down all complained 
of material, and no incentive to leave up material that could be protected speech. 
Moreover, courts have fretted that ISPs are not in the position to know or judge 
which statements are defamatory, and could not keep pace with every user who 
complains that she does not like what someone else said. First, ISPs do not neces-
sarily have to resort to taking down all complained of material. For example, if 
User complains of defamatory content on Bulletin A. The ISP could simply place a 
disclaimer on Bulletin A stating that the allegations are not supported by fact, or 
 ________________________  
 109. Courts Attack Immunity, Apr. 4, 2008, 
http://johndozierjr.typepad.com/dozierinternetlaw/2008/04/dozier-intern-1.html. The commentator mentioned as 
noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit is traditionally one of the most liberal when it comes to free speech rights. Id.
 110. Courts Attack Immunity, supra note 109. This commentator also noted that the United Kingdom does 
not have an immunity law similar to section 230 and recently exercised jurisdiction over a comment published in 
the United States. Id. The British court handed down a six figure verdict for a “mobosphere” attack. Id.
 111. Laura Parker, Jury awards $11.3M over defamatory Internet posts, USA TODAY, Oct. 11, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-10-internet-defamation-case_x.htm.  
 112. Id.
 113. Id. Scheff said she pursued the lawsuit to send a message to people who are using the Internet to de-
stroy people they do not like. Id.
12
Barry Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 6
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol14/iss1/6
Spring 2010 Communication Indecency 135
that they may be defamatory. Additionally, ISPs could install software that eva-
luates reported posts to determine if they simply state an opinion. For example, if 
software was designed to detect words like “feel,” “think,” “in my opinion,” “be-
lieve,” and so forth, the software would be able to detect opinion statements that 
cannot be defamatory and would require no action by the ISP.  
Congress could also regulate defamation liability similar to how the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) regulates liability for copyright infringe-
ment over the Internet. The DMCA has extensive notice and takedown procedures 
that protect both copyright holders and fair users. Generally, ISPs must comply 
with standard technical measures, and must remove repeat infringers.114 Addition-
ally, in order to avoid liability for contributory infringement ISPs: 1) must not re-
ceive any benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity; 2) must not be 
aware of the presence of infringing material, or know any facts that would make 
the infringing material apparent; and 3) upon receiving notice from copyright own-
ers, must act expeditiously to remove the purported infringing material.115 Moreo-
ver, the DMCA requires copyright owners provide specific notice of possible in-
fringement. The owner must identify the original copyrighted work and the alleged 
infringing material with enough particularity to allow the ISP to locate it.116 The 
complaining party must submit two statements: first, that he has a good-faith belief 
that the material is infringing on a copyright; and second, that the information in 
the notice is accurate.117 Finally, the ISP must designate an agent to receive notifi-
cations of alleged infringement and must provide the agent’s contact information 
on the ISP’s website.118
The standards provided under the DMCA strike a balance between the exclu-
sive rights granted to copyright holders and the fair use right of the public to use 
certain copyrighted works. Similar standards should be enacted to protect victims 
of defamation, while also staying true to the First Amendment’s guarantee of free-
dom of speech.  
First, new legislation should mimic the DMCA’s notice requirements by im-
plementing a procedure by which complainants can notify ISPs of defamatory ma-
terial. The complainant’s notice should be required to state:
1. With particularity what material is defamatory and where the material is lo-
cated on the website; 
2. That the alleged defamatory material is presented as fact, not opinion, and 
that it is false; and 
3. Under penalty of perjury, that the information included in the notice is true 
to the best of the complainant’s knowledge.119
 ________________________  
 114. 17 U.S.C.A § 512.  
 115. Id. at §§ 512(c)(1)(A)-(C).  
 116. Id. at §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(ii),(iii). The notice must also include a written or electronic signature and suffi-
cient information to allow the ISP to contact the owner. Id. at §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(i),(iv). 
 117. Id. at §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v),(vi). 
 118. Id. at § 512(c)(2). 
 119. Of course, the notice must also include the complainant’s contact information and signature. And, like 
under the DMCA, if the complainant fails to comply with the notice requirements, the ISP should not be held 
liable as a publisher of the defamatory content. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(B). 
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Second, the new legislation should maintain the DMCA’s requirements that the 
ISP not receive a benefit attributable to the defamation120 and not have knowledge 
of the defamatory nature of the material. Finally, upon receiving notice, the ISP 
should be required to act in one of three ways: by removing the defamatory materi-
al; by removing the defamatory material and posting a retraction; or by simply 
posting notice that the material may be defamatory.121
This type of legislative act upholds the First Amendment values while allowing 
redress for defamation victims. By exempting opinion statements, and requiring the 
complainant to attest to the falseness of the alleged defamatory material, the notice 
provision restricts claims that can be made. This prevents complainants from ask-
ing ISPs to remove every unpopular statement that may nevertheless be protected 
under the First Amendment. Additionally, the ISP may not be required to take 
down all allegedly defamatory material. The ISP may be given the option to simply 
add notice to the site stating that the material may be defamatory. Allowing the 
material to remain on the site gives additional First Amendment protection because 
the speech is not stifled.  
It is clear that the Communications Decency Act has not advanced decency on 
the Internet. Congress must reevaluate the CDA and legislate to balance the com-
peting interest of free speech and the right to redress when defamation occurs of 
the Internet.  
 ________________________  
 120. This would address situations such as the Blumenthal case where AOL benefited from actively promot-
ing the Drudge report. See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. 44. 
 121. The author finds it best to leave to congress which reaction is the most appropriate, however, ideally 
the reaction of the ISP would respond to the gravity of the defamation and ability of the complainant to show that 
the material is false. For example: P, an elementary school principal, views a statement on Yahoogle alleging she 
was arrested on March 15 for bribing public officials in order to avoid prosecution for prostitution. P sends Ya-
hoogle appropriate notice that the information is defamatory, and includes airline tickets showing she was out of 
town on March 15. Because the defamatory statements could be extremely damaging to P’s professional career, 
and because P has provided concrete evidence that the statements are untrue, Yahoogle should both remove the 
defamatory content and post a retraction. On the other hand, assume Q, a mail delivery worker, views a statement 
on Yahoogle that claims he is cheating on his wife. Q then sends appropriate notice to Yahoogle, simply stating 
that the claim is untrue. In this situation it may suffice for Yahoogle to only remove the statement, or to simply 
post notice that the statement may be defamatory.  
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